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Introduction 
The financial statements aim to deliver 
information about the financial position, 
financial performance, and cash flow of 
the entity that is beneficial for most users 
of financial statements within making 
economic decisions and shows the output 
of management's accountability for the 
using of resources that have been 
entrusted (Dewan Standar Akuntansi 
Syariah-IAI, 2016). Earnings information 
is one of the components of financial 
statements. Earnings information is used 
to measure management's performance, 
and the efficient use of funds invested in 
entities manifested in returns and 
indicators for increasing wealth by 
interested parties (Agustia, 2013). 
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A B S T R A C T 
 
Earnings is one of the management assessment tools as a form of 
responsibility to investors, thus allowing opportunistic behavior to 
do earnings management. The study aims to determine the effect of 
good corporate governance, free cash flow, and tax planning on 
earnings management. In this study, the independent variables are 
the board of independent commissioners, institutional ownership, 
audit committee, free cash flow, and tax planning. The dependent 
variable is earnings management which is projected through 
discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model. Data 
collected in this study used the documentation method and library 
method. The object of this study is state-owned companies listed in 
the 2014-2018 period of the Indonesian Stock Exchange. The 
sampling technique used purposive sampling, and the analysis 
technique used multiple linear. This study shows that a partial board 
of independent commissioners, institutional ownership, audit 
committee, and tax planning do not significantly affect earnings 
management. In contrast, free cash flow has a significant negative 
impact on earnings management. Therefore, implementing good 
corporate governance, free cash flow, and tax planning which is not 
just to fulfill existing regulations, will increase performance and 
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earnings in management's assessment as a 
form of responsibility, opportunistic 
behavior often arises (Sulistiyanto, 2008). 
Indications of earnings management 
bring-off in several state-owned 
companies in Indonesia within a period 
are indeed a problem in itself. The 
financial scandals referred to include: 
Table 1.  
List of Companies that Have Been Affected by 
Earnings Management Cases 
Corporate Year 
PT Waskita Karya (Persero) Tbk 2009 
PT Bumi Resources Tbk 2012 
PT Timah (Persero) Tbk 2015 
PT Bank Bukopin Tbk 2017 
PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk. 
2018 
PT Asuransi Jiwasraya (Persero) 2019 
Source: Secondary data processed (2020) 
The case of PT Garuda Indonesia 
(Persero) Tbk began when reporting 
overall economic performance for the 
economic year 2018 to the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange, which reported a net 
profit of USD 809,000. However, two 
commissioners expressed objections to 
the report relating to the recording of 
receivable income by the airline in the 
form of company profits in the 2018 
annual book, where Garuda Indonesia 
claims a profit of USD 5.01 million from 
cooperation with PT Mahata Aero 
Teknologi. Later, the airline was 
convicted and subjected to fines and 
obligations to restate financial statements 
in the 2018 financial year. In its latest 
report, PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk recorded a loss of USD 175.02 
million after Mahata's receivables were 
not included in revenue (JIBI, 2019). 
The Jiwasraya case stems from the 
Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) findings 
on companies that have made false profits 
since 2006 through accounting 
engineering activities (Halim, 2020). In 
comparison, the problems in Jiwasraya 
began in 2004 by reporting smaller 
reserves than they were supposed to reach 
IDR 2.769 trillion. In 2019, Jiwasraya’s 
managing director said it needed a capital 
injection of IDR 32.89 trillion to meet the 
risk-based capital adequacy ratio. The 
company's assets were recorded at only 
IDR 23.26 trillion, liabilities were IDR 
50.5 trillion, and negative equity was IDR 
27.24 trillion. In addition, the problematic 
JS Saving Plan liabilities amounted to IDR 
15.75 trillion, and defaults on JS Saving 
Plan products reached IDR 12.4 trillion 
(Sembiring, 2019). 
Earnings management is a deliberate 
control intervention to figure out 
earnings, usually to meet individual goals. 
Earnings management practices can 
erode investor self-assurance within 
financial reporting and hamper the 
smooth float of capital on the financial 
markets (Sutino & Khoiruddin, 2016). 
Schipper (1989) in (Nurianah, 2019) 
explained that earnings management is an 
intervention with a specific purpose 
towards a particular process in financial 
reporting. Conflicts of interest between 
managers and investors that occur inside 
the entity can be minimized through 
tracking mechanisms that aim to align 
these interests (Gunawan & Situmorang, 
2016). 
The monitoring mechanism is carried out 
through the implementation of good 
corporate governance (Kusmayadi, 2015). 
There are three factors within the 
At-Taqaddum 
Vol. 13 No. 1 (2021) Pg. 1-20 
 
 
3 | P a g e  
 
implementation of good corporate 
governance, namely: a) A specific 
corporate governance mechanism, 
consisting of share ownership structure, 
company financing, auditing, audit 
committee, board of directors, and 
management repayment; b) Country-
precise governance mechanisms, 
consisting of the felony environment, the 
cultural environment, the preparation of 
accounting standards, also accounting 
practices; c) marketplace governance 
mechanisms, consisting of markets for 
corporate control, and capital market 
returns (Kusmayadi, 2015). 
An independent board of commissioners 
is a member of the board of 
commissioners that does not have 
economic, management, share 
proprietorship, and potentially different 
relationships that can impact to act 
independently (Rahmawati, 2013). Hayati 
& Gusnardi (2012) stated that the 
independent board of commissioners 
impacts earnings management.  
Rahmawati (2013) stated that the 
independent board of commissioners 
harms earnings management. At the same 
time, Kusumawati (2019) stated that the 
independent board of commissioners has 
no impact on earnings management.  
Institutional ownership is the percentage 
of shares owned by institutional investors. 
It influences institutional ownership 
earnings management (Hayati & 
Gusnardi, 2012). Octavia (2017) stated 
that institutional ownership has a 
significant positive impact on earnings 
management. At the same time, 
Kusumawati (2019) stated that 
institutional ownership has no impact on 
earnings management. Free cash flow is 
cash flow that exceeds the amount needed 
after the company has funded all relevant 
working capital projects or investments 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore, free cash flow 
hurts profits management (Agustia, 2013, 
Rahayu et al., 2018). Meanwhile, the 
research conducted by Putri & 
Rachmawati (2018) stated that free cash 
flow has no impact on profits 
management.  
 Tax planning is a set of strategies to 
adjust accounting and company finance 
to reduce tax duties in ways that do not 
violate applicable taxation rules (Sari et al., 
2018). Negara and Suputra (2017) stated 
that tax planning positively impacts 
earnings, while Kusumawati (2019) found 
that tax planning has no impact on 
earnings management. 
Based on the results of research and 
existing phenomena, this study aims to 
determine and analyze earnings 
management, in addition to three organs 
of good corporate governance, namely 
the independent board of commissioners, 
institutional ownership, audit committee, 
and free cash flow, along with tax 
planning as independent variables. The 
implementation of good corporate 
governance is measured through an 
independent board of commissioners, 
institutional ownership, and audit 
committee. The three variables were 
independent parties who supervise 
management to become obstacles for 
management to carry out earnings 
management. In addition, other factors 
that could affect earnings management 
are free cash flow and tax planning. Free 
cash flow is used to check the company's 
financial flexibility through free cash flow 
analysis. Tax planning is used to see the 
At-Taqaddum 
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company's strategy in carrying out tax 
efficiency in financial statements. This 
research focuses on ongoing public state-
owned corporations listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2014-
2018, which is the latest data until this 
research is relevant. 
Literature Review 
Agency Theory 
The agency problem is a problem that 
appears due to information asymmetry 
(Yogi & Damayanthi, 2016). Agency cost 
appearance can’t be separated from 
information asymmetry or conflicts of 
interest between managers and principals. 
Creating a system that can monitor 
agents' behavior will lead to agency costs 
consisting of costs for creating standards, 
agency monitoring, creation of 
accounting information systems, and so 
forth (Anggraeni, 2011). In the view of 
Islam, opportunistic behavior is certainly 
not allowed because it betrays the 
mandate. As contained in the word of 
Allah, which means: "O you who believe, 
do not betray Allah and the Apostle 
(Muhammad) and (also) do not betray the 
mandates entrusted to you" (QS. Al-
Anfaal: 27). 
In carrying out the employment contract, 
the agent and stakeholders should 
maintain the mandate and not betray each 
other. Therefore, the contractual 
relationship between the agent and the 
principal is balanced, systematically 
showing the optimal implementation of 
obligations. It is implemented through 
agents and awards by the principal to the 
agent to realize the ideal agent-principal 
relationship. Thus, the contractual 
relationship is entirely responsible and 
free from cheating practices, producing 
valid financial reports. According to Scott 
in Aditama & Purwaningsih (2014), there 
are several motivations for management 
actions, including providing information 
to investors, CEO turnover motivation, 
Initial Public Offering, bonus motivation, 
debt agreement violation motivation, and 
tax motivation and political motivation. 
In addition, Muliasari & Dianati (2014) 
research stated that the assessment of 
earnings management is relevant to 
Islamic business ethics based on the word 
of God in Surah An-Nisa verse 135. 
Based on Muliasari & Dianati (2014), a 
Muslim must testify as he is, even if it can 
harm himself or his family because that 
has become a general principle of 
testimony. Muslims are not limited to 
testimony only in court but also when a 
transaction is included in financial 
reporting. Transactions require 
symmetrical information between buyers 
and sellers—no confidential information. 
This means that Islam's concern is 
symmetrical information; it should not 
hide information that allows people to 
change their minds. In Islamic ethics, the 
logic must present it as it is. According to 
Marzuqi & Latif (2010), Islamic business 
is a series of business activities in various 
forms that are not limited to the amount 
of ownership, including profits, but are 
limited in obtaining it and using their 
assets based on Surah Al-Baqarah verse 
188.  
From the above explanation, Islam 
considers that managers and accountants 
must have good characters like honesty, 
keep the mandate, and be honest in 
reporting the results of financial 
At-Taqaddum 
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statements to its users. Honesty is one of 
the most important capitals in doing 
business because honesty will avoid 
harming either party. Thus, Islamic 
business ethics upholds the spirit of 
mutual trust, honesty, and justice 
(Marzuqi & Latif, 2010). 
Good Corporate Governance 
Good corporate governance is a notion 
that dramatically emphasizes the honor 
regarding the appropriateness of 
shareholders to obtain and demonstrate 
the company's obligation to disclose all 
data on the corporate's economic 
performance accurately, timely, and 
transparently (Fitri, 2018). From an 
Islamic perspective, there is no standard 
formula in this regard. However, from the 
various statements contained in the verses 
of Koran regarding good corporate 
governance in the perspective of sharia, it 
can be constructed, such as in Surah Hud 
verse 61 and Surah al-Hajj verse 41, which 
means: "He has created you from the 
earth (land) which made you so prosper it 
(build it)." (QS.Hud: 61) and "(Namely) 
those who, if We affirm their position on 
the earth, they perform prayers, perform 
alms, and order to do kindness (amar 
ma'ruf) and prevent from unjust acts (nahi 
munkar); and to Allah, all matters 
return."(QS. Al-Hajj: 41). 
Based on the two verses above, the first 
verse explains that human's main mission 
is to build the earth. Whereas in Surah al-
Hajj verse 41, it is stressed that believers 
use the power they have to establish 
prayer, pay zakat and enforce amar ma'ruf 
nahi mungkar. So, the stance formulated by 
good corporate governance in Islamic law 
is the use of authority to manage 
development oriented to 1) Create a 
conducive atmosphere for the 
community to fulfill spiritual needs as 
symbolized by the enforcement of prayer, 
2). The creation of prosperity and welfare 
symbolized through zakat, and 3). The 
creation of political stability inspired by 
amar ma'ruf and nahi mungkar (Setyono, 
2015). 
Free Cash Flow 
Free cash flow is the amount regarding 
discretionary cash flow that a corporate 
has. The term free cash flow refers to the 
cash flow available to be disbursed in 
conformity with stakeholders after the 
corporate invests in additional fixed 
assets; an enlargement of working capital 
is needed to maintain the company's 
growth. Free cash flow can be measured 
through a formula according to Kieso et 
al. (2007), that is, by calculating between 
cash flow from operating activities and 
capital expenditures. Operating Cash 
Flow (OCF) is cash provided by operating 
activities that originate from excess cash 
obtained from cash payments from 
operating activities, which is set through 
conversion from an accrual basis to a cash 
basis. OCF consists of all the company's 
main activities in making a profit, so 
depreciation and amortization are not 
included because they are not cash 
outflows (Ross et al., 2015). The capital 
expenditure in question is net working 
capital, which is obtained from the 
difference in costs incurred to spend fixed 
assets minus the cash received from the 
sale of fixed assets (Ross et al., 2015). The 
measurement of free cash flow in this 
study is divided by total assets in the same 
period. Thus, it can be more comparable 
for the sample company and its value 
becomes more relative to the company's 
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Tax planning is an exertion that 
encompasses tax planning, so the taxes 
paid by companies are genuinely efficient. 
Tax planning organizes individual 
taxpayers and enterprise entities by 
utilizing various possibilities of loopholes 
taken by companies in the corridor of tax 
regulations so that taxpayers can pay a 
minimum amount (Pohan, 2013). This 
study's measurement of tax planning is 
calculated through tax retention rate, 
which analyzes the effectiveness of tax 
management in financial reporting for the 
current year (Awwaliyah et al., 2019). The 
calculation of the effectiveness of tax 
management itself is the calculation of the 
effectiveness of tax planning (Aditama & 
Purwaningsih, 2014). The tax retention 
rate is obtained by dividing the net 
income value with profit before taxing in 
the current year. 
Effect of Relationship between 
Independent Boards of 
Commissioners on Earnings 
Management 
The independent board of commissioners 
is a part of the board of commissioners 
from the corporate external whose job is 
to supervise the corporate and act as 
agent of shareholders. According to 
agency theory, there are three 
assumptions about human nature that 
might be commonly self-centered, have 
limited thinking power facing the future, 
and try to keep away from risk. According 
to this assumption, the manager will act 
opportunistically for personal interests 
rather than for common interests and 
fulfill his principal responsibilities. 
The existence of an independent board of 
commissioners as a form of good 
corporate governance can reduce 
irregularities committed by the manager 
(agent). Some previous studies have 
shown the same results, including 
research by Gunawan & Situmorang 
(2016), Patrick et al. (2015), Hayati & 
Gusnardi (2012), Rahmawati (2013),  
Octavia (2017), and (Ulum et al., 2020). In 
comparison, Kusumawati (2019) has 
found that the independent board of 
commissioners has no impact on earnings 
management. Based on previous 
researches and agency theory, the 
hypotheses proposed were: 
H1: Independent commissioner has a 
negative effect on earnings management. 
Effect of Relationship between 
Institutional Ownership on Earnings 
Management 
Institutional ownership is the proportion 
of business enterprise stocks owned by 
institutions like investment corporations 
and other institutions. Institutional 
investors are assumed to be experienced 
people and can do better financial analysis 
to oversee and reduce earnings 
management practices in the corporate. 
Based on agency theory, the manager as 
an agent who the principal gives the 
mandate and responsibility has to access 
information more related to the company 
so that it is prone to be manipulated for 
the benefit of the agent himself. 
Therefore, an institutional investor who 
has more experience and can do better 
financial analysis will suppress earnings 
management practices and fraud that the 
agents may carry out. This is in line with 
research by Hayati & Gusnardi (2012), 
Kusumaningtyas & Farida (2015) and 
At-Taqaddum 
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Octavia (2017). Whereas other studies, 
including research by Rahayu et al. (2018), 
Kusumawati et al. (2013), and 
Kusumawati (2019), have shown different 
things. Based on previous researches and 
agency theory, the proposed hypothesis 
is: 
H2: Institutional ownership harms 
earnings management 
Effect of Relationship between Audit 
Committees on Earnings 
Management 
The audit committee is a party that helps 
the board of commissioners whose 
activity is to supervise to increase the 
effectiveness in creating financial 
disclosure and reporting, compliance with 
legal guidelines and regulations, and 
internal control of the corporate 
(Sulistiyanto, 2008). According to agency 
theory, the agent who is given the 
mandate and responsibility in managing 
the company is certainly demanded by the 
principal to improve its performance to 
get high compensation. Therefore, if 
there is no adequate supervision, it will be 
vulnerable to being played by agents as if 
the target is achieved. Thus, it is necessary 
to have a party given the authority and 
accountability to prepare financial 
reporting and observe the internal control 
system. The task is then delegated to the 
audit committee. 
The results of Kusumaningtyas and 
Farida (2015), Octavia (2017), and 
Kusumawati (2019) have shown that the 
audit committee harm earnings 
management. In comparison, the results 
of Gunawan & Situmorang (2016) and 
Rahmawati (2013) have shown that the 
audit committee has no impact on 
earnings management. Therefore, based 
on agency theory and previous researches, 
the proposed hypothesis is: 
H3: Audit committee has a negative effect 
on earning management. 
Effect of Relationship between Free 
Cash Flow on Earnings Management 
Free cash flow with earnings management 
can be defined in agency theory. In agency 
theory, one of the causes of issues among 
management and shareholders is a 
conflict of interest. One of those conflicts 
of interest is related to company free cash 
flow. When free cash flow is in a 
significant position, management can 
report lower profits. Free cash flow is 
used as part of company investment or 
other forms of funding that management 
can make (Kusumawati, 2019). A 
corporation with a significant value of 
free cash flow tends not to do earnings 
management. Investors who invest their 
funds temporarily will focus more on 
information about the quantity of free 
cash flow that shows how corporations 
distribute dividends (Kusumawati, 2019). 
Research by Agustia (2013) has shown 
that free cash flow harms earnings 
management. This is consistent with the 
research by Rahayu et al. (2018) and 
Kusumawati (2019), which show that free 
cash flow impacts earnings management. 
Meanwhile, Putri & Rachmawati (2018) 
research has shown that free cash flow 
has no impact on profits management. 
Therefore, based on agency theory and 
previous research results, the proposed 
hypothesis is: 
H4: Free cash flow has a negative effect 
on earnings management. 
Effect of Relationship between Tax 
Plannings on Earnings Management 
At-Taqaddum 
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Tax planning relation with earnings 
management through agency theory. Tax 
planning arises because there are 
distinctions in intention between 
companies and governments. The 
distinction in intention lies in companies 
trying to pay taxes to a minimum to 
reduce the profits they have earned, 
whereas the government relies on tax 
payments to address state spending. Thus, 
the higher the tax-making plans, the 
greater the business does earnings 
management. One of the tax plans is by 
regulating how much of the reported 
profits are included in earnings 
management practices. If the profits 
obtained are high, the company tends to 
manage earnings to minimize the profits 
obtained; accordingly, the tax expenses 
are low (Ayem & Arifah, 2019). 
The results of the research of Ayem & 
Arifah (2019), Negara & Suputra (2017), 
Kesaulya & Febriany (2018) have shown 
that tax planning has a positive impact on 
earnings management. In contrast, Sari et 
al. (2018) and Kusumawati (2019) have 
shown that tax planning had no impact on 
earnings management. Therefore, based 
on the agency theory and previous 
studies’ results, the proposed hypothesis 
is: 
H5: Tax planning has a positive effect on 
earnings management. 
 
Figure 1.  
Theoretical Framework of Thinking










      
Audit Committee 
 
      
Free Cash Flow 





Source: Secondary data processed  
 
Research Method 
The type of this research is quantitative 
research using multiple linear regression 
analysis techniques. Data sources were 
from annual reports, financial reports, 
and other supporting reports in 2014-
2018. Data was obtained through the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange website and 
other sites that support the research, 
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official website. The population in this 
research was state-owned corporations 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2014-2018. Meanwhile, the samples in 
this study were all state-owned 
corporations listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2014-2018. The 
sampling technique used was purposive.   




State-owned corporations registered on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 
2014-2018 
20 
Corporations that are incompatible and do not have all the data  (4) 
linked to the variables used in the research 
Corporations that do not publish successive financial statements  (3) 
in rupiah currency 
The selected company is the sample 13 
Period 2014-2018 (5 years) = multiplied by 5 65 
Outlier samples (28) 
Number of samples in the study 37 
Source: Secondary data processed (2020) 
 
Research and Measurement Variables 
 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable was earnings 
management that proxied with 
discretionary accruals and calculated with 
a modified Jones model. Discretionary 
accruals deliberately followed the 
formula: 
𝐓𝐀𝐢𝐭  =  𝐍𝐈𝐢𝐭  −  𝐂𝐅𝐎𝐢𝐭 
The Total Accrual value calculated by the 
OLS (Ordinary Least Square) regression 
equation followed the formula:   
TAit/Ait-1 = β1 (1/Ait-1) + β2 
(ΔRevt/Ait-1) + β3 (PPEt/Ait-1) + e 
Meanwhile, the value of non-
discretionary accruals (NDA) is calculated 
using the formula: 
DAit = TAit / Ait-1 - NDAit 
Furthermore Discretionary Accruals 
(DA) could be calculated as follows:  
NDAit = β1 (1 / Ait-1) + β2 (ΔRevt / 
Ait-1– ectRect / Ait-1) + β3 (PPEt / 
Ait-1) 
Information:  
DAit   Discretionary Accruals 
company i in period t  
NDAit  Non-Discretionary Accruals 
company i in period t  
TAit  Total Accruals of the 
company i in period t  
NI Net income of company i in 
period t  
CFOit  Cash flows from operating 
activities of the company I in 
period t 
At-Taqaddum 
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Ait-1 Total assets of a company i in 
period t-1  
ΔRevt  Changes in company income 
i in period t  
PPEt  The company's fixed assets in 
period t  
ΔRect  Change in company 
receivables i in period t  
e error 
 Independent Variable 
1. Independent Board of Commissioners 
(IBC) 
An independent board of 
commissioners is a member or board 
of commissioners who do not affiliate 
with management, another member of 
the board of commissioners, 
controlling stakeholders, and free 
from all forms of relation that can 
influence its ability to behave 
independently (Arintasari & Rohman, 
2015). The IBC passed through the 
formula:  
  
𝐈𝐁𝐂 =  
𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐢𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐛𝐨𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐨𝐟 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬
𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐦𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐛𝐨𝐚𝐫𝐝 𝐨𝐟 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬
 𝐱 𝟏𝟎𝟎% 
 
2. Institutional Ownership (IO) 
Institutional ownership is the total 
proportion of corporation shares 
owned by institutions such as 
investment companies and other 
institutions. Institutions with shares in 
the company can monitor and control 
managers, so the manager can be more 
focused on the corporation's 
performance and values to minimize 
the manager's earnings management 
towards the corporation. The formula 




𝐀𝐦𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐬 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐝 𝐛𝐲 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐢𝐧𝐯𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐬
𝐀𝐦𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐥𝐥 𝐜𝐢𝐫𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝 𝐬𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐬
 𝒙 𝟏𝟎𝟎% 
 
3. Audit Committee 
The audit committee is the party in 
charge of supervision to improve 
effectiveness in creating quality 
financial disclosure and reporting. 
According to the Financial Services 
Authority (OJK) Regulation Article 4 
Number 55/POJK.04/2015 
concerning the Formation and 
Guidelines for the Work of the Audit 
Committee, it is stated that the audit 
committee includes at least 3 (three) 
members from Independent 
Commissioners and parties from 
outside the issuer (Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan, 2015). Therefore, the audit 
committee is measured using the 
number of audit committee members 
in the corporation. 
4. Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
Free cash flow is calculated by 
subtracting cash flow from operating 
activities minus investment divided by 
the aid of total debt (Jensen, 1986). 
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The free cash flow formula is divided 
by total assets in that same period to 
be more comparable for the sample 
company. Its value becomes more 
relative to the company's size. So 
according to Rosdini (2009) in Yogi & 
Damayanthi (2016), free cash flow is 
measured by the following formula: 
 
𝐅𝐂𝐅 =
𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐂𝐚𝐬𝐡 𝐅𝐥𝐨𝐰 − 𝐂𝐚𝐩𝐢𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞
𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬
 𝐱 𝟏𝟎𝟎% 
 
 
5. Tax Planning  
Tax planning is part of tax 
management and is the first step in 
carrying out tax management. Tax 
planning is measured using the tax 
retention rate formula, which analyzes 
the effectiveness of tax management in 
financial reporting for the current year. 
Tax planning in this research used the 
tax retention rate formula by Aditama 
& Purwaningsih (2014) as follows:  
 
𝐓𝐚𝐱 𝐑𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐑𝐚𝐭𝐞 =
𝐍𝐞𝐭 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞
𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐱 𝐈𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐞 (𝐄𝐁𝐈𝐓)
 𝐱 𝟏𝟎𝟎% 
 
Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistical analysis was carried 
out to determine the descriptive picture 
of the variables studied, namely mean, 
minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation of each independent and 
dependent variable (Hayati & Gusnardi, 
2012). This research's descriptive 
statistical measurements were carried out 
using the IBM Statistical Package for 
Social Science (SPSS) version 23. 
The regression analysis equation model 
developed in this research are: 
 
𝐃𝐀 = 𝛂 + 𝛃𝟏  𝐈𝐁𝐂𝐢𝐭 +  𝛃𝟐𝐈𝐎𝐢𝐭 +  𝛃𝟑𝐀𝐂𝐢𝐭 + 𝛃𝟒𝐅𝐂𝐅𝐢𝐭 +  𝛃𝟓𝐓𝐏𝐢𝐭 +  𝐞 
 
Information: 
DA discretionary accrual (proxy 
for earnings management) 
α  constant 
β1 − β5 regression coefficient 
IBCit  percentage of independent 
boards of commissioners in 
company i in period t  
IOit percentage of institutional 
ownership in company i in 
period t 
ACit percentage of the audit 
committee in company i in 
period t 
FCFit percentage free cash flow in 
company i in period t 
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TPit percentage of tax planning in 
company i in period t 
e error coefficient 
Result and Discussion 
Description of Research Results 
Earnings management proxied by 
discretionary accruals (Y) had a minimum 
value of -0.00428 found in PT Aneka 
Tambang (Persero) Tbk (2015) and a 
maximum value of 0.01326 found in PT 
Pembangunan Perumahan (Persero) Tbk 
(2016), while the overall average value was 
0.0043876. The independent 
commissioner variable (X1) has a 
minimum value of 0.2 found in PT Semen 
Baturaja (Persero) Tbk (2016), while the 
maximum value was 0.5 found in PT 
Pembangunan Perumahan (Persero). Tbk 
(2015) and PT Timah (Persero) Tbk 
(2016), while the overall average value was 
0,3505768. The institutional ownership 
variable (X2) had a minimum value of 
0,79673 found in PT Waskita Karya 
(Persero) Tbk (2015), and a maximum 
value of 0.99984 was in PT Jasa Marga 
(Persero) Tbk (2014 and 2015), while the 
overall average score was 0.9252768.  
The audit committee variable (X3) had a 
minimum value of 2 in PT Adhi Karya 
(Persero). Tbk (2014) and a maximum 
value of 5 found in PT Adhi Karya 
(Persero).Tbk (2017) and PT Wijaya Karya 
(Persero). Tbk (2018) while the overall 
average value was 3.6216. The free cash 
flow variable (X4) had a minimum value of 
-010737 in PT Adhi Karya (Persero) Tbk 
(2017), and the maximum value in PT 
Semen Indonesia (Persero) Tbk (2016) was 
0.23165, while the average was 0.0590414. 
The tax planning variable (X5) had a 
minimum value of 0.51436 in PT Aneka 
Tambang (Persero) Tbk (2016) and a 
maximum value of 0.99311 in 
PT.Adhi.Karya.(Persero). Tbk (2018), 
while the average was 0.7442368. 
 
Table 3.  
Summary of Classical Assumption Test  
 
Multicollinearity Testing Results Tolerance VIF 
a. Independent Board of Commissioners 0.921 1,086 
b. Institutional Ownership 0.780 1,282 
c. Audit Committee .806 1,241 
d. Free Cash Flow 0.718 1,393 
e. Tax Planning 0.860 1,163 
Heteroscedasticity Test Results (Glejser Test) Sig. T-test 
 
a. Independent Board of Commissioners 0.733 
 
b. Institutional Ownership 0.805 
 
c. Audit Committee 0.775 
 
d. Free Cash Flow 0.745 
 
e. Tax Planning .801 
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Residual Normality Testing 
  
Kolmogorov Smirnov .200 
 
Autocorrelation Testing Results 
  
a. The Durbin Watson Test 1,710 
 
b. Test Run Test 0.507 
 
 N = 37 
  
Source: Outcome from SPSS (2020) 
Based on table 3, the normality test results 
through the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
show a significance value of 0.200. Thus, it 
must be stacked so that the input is 
normally distributed. While the results of 
the multicollinearity test show the 
tolerance value of all variables is close to 1, 
while the VIF value is not more than 10. 




Coefficient of Determination 
 
Table 4.  
Determination Coefficient Results 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
1 . 488a . 238 . 115 
Source: Outcome from SPSS (2020) 
Based on table 4, the adjusted R square 
percentage was 11.5% or 0.115. This shows 
that the independent variable can explain 
the dependent variable at 11.5%, and then 
about 88.5% is clarified by other variables 
outside this study. 
Table 5.  






 B Std. Error Beta t Sig 




. 011 . 011 . 163 . 997 . 327 
Institutional 
Ownership 
. 015 . 011 . 244 1.375 . 179 
Audit Committee -. 001 . 001 -. 218 -1.250 . 221 
Free Cash Flow - 021 . 010 -. 400 -2.162 . 038 
Tax Planning . 004 . 005 . 139 . 820 . 418 
Source: Outcome from SPSS (2020) 
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Discussion of Research Results 
The Effect of the Independent Board of 
Commissioners on Earnings 
Management 
Hypothesis 1 test outcome from table 5 
indicates that the independent 
commissioner variable does not 
significantly affect earnings management. 
This is proven by the t value of 0.997 and 
the significance value of 0.327. Thus, it 
concludes that hypothesis 1 is rejected, 
which means that the size of the 
independent board of commissioners has 
no significant effect on earnings 
management in SOEs enlisted at the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2014-
2018 period. 
As one of the principles in implementing 
good corporate governance, the 
independent board of commissioners is 
predicted to act independently and make 
effective, appropriate, and fast decisions to 
perform their independence and criticality 
to uncover earnings management practices 
(Prabowo, 2018). According to Securities 
Listing Regulation No. 1-A concerning 
General Provisions for Registering Equity 
Securities on the Stock Exchange, the 
board of commissioners includes two 
members of the board of commissioners, 
one among whom is an independent 
commissioner. If it consists of more than 
two members of the board of 
commissioners, then the members of 
independent commissioners must be at 
least 30% from all members of the board 
of commissioners. However, sometimes 
these provisions are only made to comply 
with regulations so that good corporate 
governance can be realized even though 
there are not necessarily such guarantees in 
practice. Thus, the proportion of 
independent commissioners cannot reduce 
earnings management practices (Prabowo, 
2018)(Prabowo, 2018). The results of this 
study are in line and consistent with the 
results of the study of Rahayu et al. (2018) 
and Kusumawati (2019), which state that 
the independent board of commissioners 
does not affect earnings management. That 
means that the increasing percentage of 
independent commissioners does not 
significantly influence earnings 
management at the corporate. 
Thus, the independent board of 
commissioners cannot control agents to 
reduce earnings management. 
Furthermore, the higher the scale of the 
board of commissioners raises agency 
problems, such as the more members 
inside the board of commissioners, the 
company will have difficulty carrying out 
its role. For example, communicating and 
coordinating work among board members, 
struggling in tracking and controlling 
agent's actions in making decisions for the 
corporate. The board of commissioners 
who have difficulty in carrying out this role 
will cause a lack of supervision from the 
board of commissioners on the company’s 
management, which can decrease the 
company’s performance (Rahayu et al., 
2018). Furthermore, other possible causes 
such as transformations in proportion and 
scale of the board of commissioners in the 
previous research period caused the 
performance of the board of 
commissioners of the research period to be 
ineffective in carrying out its duties in 
overseeing and monitoring earnings 
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management. In addition, most 
independent boards of commissioners are 
based on the results of the GMS elected by 
the majority shareholder. Therefore, if a 
decision is not in line with the owner, a 
change can be made. Therefore, although 
the percentage of independent 
commissioners is relatively large, it cannot 
act independently and supervise. 
Effect of Institutional Ownership on 
Earnings Management 
The outcome of testing the second 
hypothesis represents that institutional 
ownership does not significantly influence 
earnings management, which is proven by 
the t value of 1.375 and the significance 
value of 0.179. Thus, it can be inferred that 
H2 is rejected, which means that whether 
big or small an institutional ownership is, it 
does not significantly affect earnings 
management in state-owned companies 
(BUMN).  
The outcome of this research is in line with 
the results of research by Kusumawati et al. 
(2013), Kusumaningtyas and Farida (2015), 
Rahayu et al. (2018), and Kusumawati 
(2019) that find the institutional ownership 
has not been able to influence earnings 
management actions. The outcome of this 
research shows that institutional investors 
cannot carry out their role effectively in 
reducing earnings management. Rahayu et 
al. (2018) state that institutional ownership 
has no impact on earnings management. 
Institutional ownership is the party with 
large-scale shares ownership that should be 
expected to control earnings management. 
Instead, it only focuses on the profits 
generated so that institutional investors 
obtain high profits (Rahayu. et al., 2018). 
As parties holding considerable 
shareholdings, institutional investors 
should have more power to control 
management to prevent or lessen earnings 
management activities. But in this 
situation, institutional investors cannot 
control the management of the company. 
This is because institutional investors do 
not play the role of experienced investors 
who have more capability and chance to 
observe and discipline management to 
focus more on the corporation's grade and 
restrict agent policies in misusing profits. 
Still, they only act as temporary owners 
who focus more on current profits 
(Kusumawati, 2019). 
Effect of the Audit Committee on 
Earning Management 
The outcome of the testing hypothesis 
indicates that the audit committee variable 
does not significantly influence earnings 
management, which is proven by the 
calculation of t value of -1.250 and 
significance value of 0.221. Thus, it can be 
inferred that H3 can be drawn, which 
means the size of the audit committee in a 
company does not affect earnings 
management in a state-owned company 
(BUMN).  
The outcome of this research is in line with 
the results of research by Hayati and 
Gusnardi (2012), Kusumawati et al. (2013), 
and Gunawan & Situmorang (2016). They 
reveal that the audit committee has not 
been one of the factors that reduce 
earnings management practices. Build 
upon the study results indicates that the 
audit committee as a corporate governance 
mechanism has no longer been capable of 
controlling earnings management activities 
by the management. This shows that the 
audit committee has not carried out its 
duties. Based on the Decree of the Minister 
of State-Owned Enterprises No. Kep-
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103/2002, the duties and responsibilities of 
the audit committee include assessing the 
implementation of the audit and its results, 
presenting guidelines for improvement, 
controlling the company's management 
system and its implementation, ensuring to 
obtain adequate evaluation methods 
(Prabowo, 2018). 
It could be visible that the audit committee 
in the company has not carried out its 
duties properly in carrying out supervision 
of the company by upholding the 
principles in corporate governance. This is 
likely because the research only links the 
presence of the audit committee and has 
not tried to prove the impact of the traits 
of the audit committee members with the 
type of earnings management. These 
characteristics are the audit committee's 
activities (the value of meetings with the 
function of the Internal Control System 
and external auditors without the presence 
of the Directors), financial literacy of audit 
committee parts, competency of audit 
committee parts, educational background, 
experience, etc. Thus this can be explained 
that the audit committee in the corporate 
may only fulfill the regulations, but it is not 
supposed to uphold good corporate 
governance within the corporate (Hayati & 
Gusnardi, 2012). 
Effects of Free Cash Flow on Earnings 
Management 
The testing results show that the free cash 
flow variable has a significant negative 
effect on earnings management. This is 
proven by the t value of -2,162 and the 
significance value of 0.038. Thus, H4 
conclusions can be drawn, meaning that 
the increasing value of free cash flow 
decreases earnings management at state-
owned companies (BUMN). In line with 
Agustia (2013), Rahayu et al. (2018), and 
Kusumawati (2019), where free cash flow 
harms earnings management. The outcome 
follows the theory that free cash flow 
affects earnings management. Corporates 
with high free cash flow tend to reduce the 
agent's intention to carry out earnings 
management activities. Free cash flow is 
the substantive cash flow that may be 
shared with investors after the corporate 
has made all the funding. Therefore, 
working capital has to preserve its 
operation continuously. 
The negative impact is that because free 
cash flow is a crucial factor in deciding 
corporate worth, corporate internals focus 
on efforts to grow free cash flow, which is 
the most attractive point for investors at 
the corporation's cash flow data. Cash flow 
data can show corporate cap potential to 
distribute dividends. The company has 
increased share prices at high cash flows 
because shareholders see that the 
corporation has extra cash for issuing a 
dividend. The more the free cash flow 
glides in the corporate, the wealthier it is 
because it has cash for growth, debt 
collection, and returns. This also signifies 
that the smaller the free cash flow a 
corporation has, the unhealthier a 
corporation can be. Because most 
investors focus more on the corporate's 
free cash flow data, corporations with high 
excessive free cash flow values generally 
tend to no longer control profits (Agustia, 
2013). 
Effect of Tax Planning on Earnings 
Management 
The fifth hypothesis testing results show 
the variable tax planning does not 
significantly influence earnings 
management, as proven by the t-value 
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calculation of 0.820 and a significance 
value of 0.418. Thus, it can be inferred that 
the H5 is rejected. That is to say, whether 
big or small a tax planning is, it has no 
effect on profits management in state-
owned companies (BUMN).  
The consequence of the research is in line 
with the consequence in research by 
Kusumawati (2019) and Sari et al. (2018), 
which find that tax planning has not to 
influence earnings management. These 
results are due to the single tax rate for 
corporation taxpayers in 2010 decreasing 
from 28% to 25%, so managers cannot 
maximize opportunities for earnings 
management. In addition, managers tend 
to review or modify tax plans that have 
been made previously (Sari et al., 2018). 
One of the objectives of tax planning is to 
use the regulation of how much profit is 
announced to include it in earnings 
management practices. In general, tax 
planning means manipulating a taxpayer's 
transaction business; thus, the tax bill is in 
a minimal value but does not violate or 
against the applicable tax policies. 
Especially for the time being, although 
there is a right to do tax planning, it is 
limited by tax rules that have been 
systematic and transparent, so it does not 
affect earnings management practices. 
Therefore, the existence of tax planning 
has not to affect earnings management 
(Kusumawati, 2019). 
Conclusion 
Based on the outcomes of testing and data 
analysis, the conclusion from this study is 
that the independent board of 
commissioners shows no significant effect 
on earnings management in state-owned 
companies. It is caused by difficulties 
experienced by members of the board of 
commissioners. The appointment of an 
independent board of commissioners is 
formed due to the shareholders' general 
meeting. The majority of shareholders elect 
it. Institutional ownership shows an 
insignificant influence on earnings 
management in state-owned companies. 
The role of institutional ownership causes 
this to be only as a temporary owner who 
is more focused on current earnings, thus 
motivating managers to do profit 
management in the short term.  The audit 
committee shows an insignificant effect on 
earnings management because the audit 
committee has not upheld good corporate 
governance. After all, there is the 
possibility that it is only limited to 
compliance with regulations. Free cash 
flow shows a significant negative influence 
on earnings management for state-owned 
companies. Then the more considerable 
the amount of free cash flow, the less the 
practice of earnings management. Tax 
planning shows the insignificant influence 
on earnings management for state-owned 
companies registered at the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in 2014-2018. Thus, 
managers cannot maximize possibilities for 
profits management due to changes in 
corporation taxpayer rates.  
Recommendation 
Some limitations in this research include 
the period in the research was only five 
years, so it is still lack in explaining 
specifically and comprehensively regarding 
the influence of variables in the research. 
Besides that, not all data are included in the 
research because there are outlier data. 
Furthermore, this research is limited to 
companies under state ownership, so many 
other companies can still change the 
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conclusions obtained. Nevertheless, 
through this research, the implementation 
of good corporate governance, free cash 
flow, and tax planning could be carried out 
optimally. In addition, the companies must 
pay attention to the recruitment process 
and educational background of an 
independent board of commissioners and 
audit committee so that professionals and 
suitable with their expertise fill the 
position. Through free cash flow and tax 
planning, good planning could be carried 
out so the operational activities could run 
well. Thus, the implementation for all 
aspects could be effective and efficient and 
increase the company’s value for 
stakeholders. 
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